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CASE IN POINT
From
lights out to
lights on
How Sunlabob went  
from providing affordable, 
sustainable energy in rural 
Laos to becoming  
an international  
turnkey operator and  
co-developer.
Progress is inherently iterative, and solving difficult 
problems usually requires multiple attempts. This is even 
more so when looking to alleviate unmet human needs in 
underdeveloped countries, where corruption, poverty, low-levels 
of human capital and inadequate infrastructure make providing 
the essentials a herculean endeavour. Often the challenges are so 
great that it takes multiple attempts–with partners working in 
concert–to develop an effective solution. 
When German Andy Schroeter arrived in northern Laos 
to work on a food security programme in 1995, he realised 
there was a huge unmet demand for electricity. Only about 
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30 percent of the country, mostly along the populated Mekong 
Valley, had access to grid electricity. The rest of Laos was basically 
dark, save for villages that ran diesel generators which provided 
limited power. 
“These could only run for a few hours at a time,” said 
Schroeter, an electrical engineer by training. “After that it was 
lights out. So I realised there’s a huge potential for rural energy, 
DQGVSHFLÀFDOO\ UHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\µ
In 2000, Schroeter relocated to Vientiane, the capital of 
/DRVWR IRXQG6XQODERE5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\ZKLFKZDVRIÀFLDOO\
established the following year as a foreign-owned commercial 
enterprise with the goal of providing affordable energy solutions 
to disadvantaged communities in rural Laos.
Learning on the job, adjusting to reality
As rural areas are often remote, they lack the necessary 
infrastructure to effectively and affordably extend electric- 
grid coverage. Modular solar photovoltaics (PV), more 
commonly known as solar electric panels, are the perfect 
solution: it is the cheapest option to generate power even 
after taking into consideration diesel generators, and can be set 
up to provide clean power to a single home or an entire village. 
PV is also more affordable than wind or 
hydroelectric power (hydro) as the latter 
two have higher capital costs and depend 
on the availability of consistent wind or 
ÁRZLQJZDWHU UHVSHFWLYHO\
7KHÀUVWREVWDFOH6FKURHWHUIDFHGZDV
the location of customers: a population 
of six million people living in an area 
the size of the U.K. (which has a 
population of 64.1 million1), but with 
very litt le infrastructure. Most of 
Schroeter’s potential customers lived 
in remote and rural areas, far away 
from Vientiane. Although many NGOs 
and internationa l donor a gencies 
operated in Laos to reach these 
communities, Schroeter was leery of 
copying their working models, as he 
thought they focused too much on 
one-off PV projects. “Some of these 
donor-funded projects may electrify 
20,000 households here and 50,000 
households there,” Schroeter explained. 
“But there isn’t enough focus on long- 
term sustainability. [PV] technology 
should run for 20 years, but a lot of 
these systems are failing after two to 
three years–it’s quite sad.”
Instead, he opted for a more 
sustainable approach that used a private 
sector model: a countrywide franchise 
network that started with 70 people 
from various ethnic groups who came 
to Vientiane to receive technical and 
business operations training. Upon 
completion of training, these franchisees 
opened an account with Sunlabob 
and returned home to set up energy- 
focused micro-enterprises. Sunlabob 
supplied the franchisees with everything 
they needed regardless of the project 
size, from a small solar lantern to entire 
village grids. 
However, this sales and installation 
model proved too costly for poor, rural 
communities that could not afford the 
upfront capital to develop such off-grid 
capabilities. Schroeter had to adjust; and 
Sunlabob switched to a ‘fee for service’ 
ÀQDQFLQJPRGHOZKHUH WKHFRPSDQ\SDLG
the upfront capital investment for rural 
electrification and essentially rented 
out the equipment. The franchisees 
then handled maintenance and payment 
collection from end users. 
While it addressed the issue of 
upfront investment, such off-g rid 
electricity was much more expensive 
than grid electricity, as the latter was 
subsidised by the government. That 
posed a problem. Schroeter elaborated, 
“We had an arrangement with the 
village and the provincial authorities for 
them to pay US 24 cents per kilowatt- 
hour. This was the best we could do to 
make such off-grid rural electrification 
commercially viable. In Europe they pay 
about US 30 cents. But here in Laos, the 
government subsidises grid users, so they 
only pay US 6 cents. So it’s in operation 
for a couple of months and then people 
realise that their cousin, grandfather, 
nephew or whoever is paying six cents 
in the electrified area. All of a sudden 
they start manipulating the metres 
and eventually stop paying. I ended up 
burning US$1.5 million and still haven’t 
recovered the investment.”
Doing good and  
doing (not so) well 
Sunlabob’s model was due for an 
overhaul. As Schroeter discovered, 
“The return on investment is too low, 
it’s absolutely too low! We made a big 
mistake when we saw the people, the 
beneficiaries, in these remote areas as 
our paying clients. Rural end-users’ 
return on investment is too low, and they 
KDYH WR FDUU\ D ÀQDQFLDO EXUGHQ IRU WRR
long. With regard to the poorest of the 
poor, such as much of the population in 
rural Laos, they’re oftentimes better off 
making investments in agriculture, in 
cash crops and productive use…not 
energy. Energy is a basic need, and public 
donors need to play a role to help ensure 
that these models are truly commercially 
viable and sustainable for a long time.”
One of the many lessons in the 
evolution of Sunlabob’s business model 
was that third-party capital was needed 
to fill the investment gap. This could 
be in the form of grants from corporate 
sponsors or international donors, with 
Sunlabob, as the private partner, taking 
on the responsibility to make rural 
HOHFWULÀFDWLRQ VXVWDLQDEOH
S ch roeter a lso rea l ised t he 
importance of securing a reliable 
revenue stream to anchor the business. 
To this end, Sunlabob operated as an 
independent renewable power producer 
and sold electricity back to the Laotian 
utility agency through a purchasing 
power agreement.
After overcoming the initial steep 
learning curve, Sunlabob understood 
clearly the needs of the developing world 
“Some of these donor-funded projects may electrify 
20,000 households here and 50,000 households 
there…But there isn’t enough focus on long-term 
sustainability. PV [Photovoltaics] technology should  
run for 20 years, but a lot of these systems are failing 
after two to three years—it’s quite sad.”  
- Andy Schroeter, founder of Sunlabob  
Renewable Energy.
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when it came to providing access to 
energ y and clean water in remote 
locations. It developed expertise in end-
user training, engineering, and project 
implementation and management. It 
maintained a high quality supplier base 
for procurement, and had the know-how 
and ability to effectively transport 
equipment like solar panels and batteries 
to remote, rural locations.
The company also recognised that 
each community it served had unique 
needs, and to meet those needs it 
prov ided a f lexible, customisable 
approach toward designing solutions–
even employing energy sources beyond 
solar. “Some of our projects that 
electrify 100 homes, 200 homes, 300 
hundred homes, need different energy 
sources,” said Schroeter. “One is just PV, 
hydro is another. We also have hybrid 
grids with a combination of energy 
sources depending on the location of 
the project and services required to 
LPSURYH HQHUJ\ HIÀFLHQF\µ
A s Sunlabob gained inva luable experience and built expertise, it 
started to better reach its designated rural customers and was publicly recognised 
for providing social good. But even though the company was doing good, 
it was not doing well. As Laos approached full electrification, the domestic 
market for new business started to shrink, which further eroded profitability. 
Sunlabob had mastered a unique set of skills as an on- and off-grid, rural renewable 
energy developer, but now faced a limited market in which to monetise that expertise. 
Schroeter’s solution was to go beyond Laos.
More money, more problems
,Q  6XQODERE KDGZRQ LWV ÀUVW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPSHWLWLYH %LGGLQJ2 project, and 
E\ LWKDGZRQPRUHELGV LQ&DPERGLD0LFURQHVLDDQG WKH0DUVKDOO ,VODQGV ,W
had also worked on projects and consulted in many other countries like Uganda, 
Afghanistan and Bhutan, and revenues had gone up tenfold.
But where there is money to be made, there will be competition. Sometimes 
the desire to win a bid comes at the expense of the project’s quality. Schroeter added, 
“We are highly recognised and have a good reputation, but we are still very small. 
We’re competing for smaller projects against other small, often local, companies. 
Many of our competitors aren’t as focused on sustainability. They’ll undercut us on 
a bid, and too often these donor agencies place too much emphasis on low cost 
when considering a bid. The result is energy systems that are in pretty bad shape after 
a few years.”
He was also worried about the risk that corruption played. Operating in 
countries with known corruption issues could place Sunlabob at higher 
reputational risk. Sunlabob was committed to transparency, and voluntarily submitted 
One of the many 
lessons in the evolution 
of Sunlabob’s business 
model was that third-
party capital was 
needed to fi ll the 
investment gap. 
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LWVHOI WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO DXGLWLQJ E\ 3ULFHZDWHUKRXVH&RRSHUV 
RU.30*RQFHD\HDUDW VLJQLÀFDQWH[SHQVH
Even when Sunlabob did convince international donors 
to choose it over other competitors, the funds were not handed 
over directly. The money was given to local governments, who 
then paid the contractors. For Schroeter, this arrangement had 
the potential to interrupt the company’s cash f low, making it 
difficult for it to operate and grow. Schroeter explained, “It 
has not been possible for us to attract capital through investment 
or acquire it through loans. Because Sunlabob is registered in 
Laos and is foreign-owned, we have to put up 130 percent 
collateral to receive a loan from a Laotian bank if we’re 
headquartered in Vientiane...We just can’t get access to 
ÀQDQFHDQG IRUHLJQ LQYHVWRUVVLPSO\DUHQ·WFRPLQJWR /DRV DQG
investing in us.” 
The Myanmar project
While Laos was no longer as attractive to investors, neighbouring 
Myanmar was a different story. In 2015, the World Bank 
estimated that only about 30 percent of the population in 
Myanmar was connected to the electricity grid, and that “average 
annual per capita electricity consumption is 160 kilowatt-hours, 
one-twentieth the world average… (and) in the countryside, the 
situation is even worse. As of 2014, only 16 percent of rural 
households had a connection.”3
With the country finally opening up, 70 percent of the 
55 million population were ready-made customers for Sunlabob. 
But Schroeter felt it made little sense to install PV solutions 
because Myanmar was much bigger than Laos (676,578 square 
km versus 236,800 square km). Bigger projects–with bigger 
potential for profit–were the order of the day, but Sunlabob 
was too small to take advantage. “We can handle an 
>HOHFWULÀFDWLRQ@ SURMHFW RI VD\86PLOOLRQµ VD\V 6FKURHWHU 
“but Myanmar is so big. The global donor agencies aren’t even 
looking at anything less than US$20 million. And even with 
all our great ideas and approaches, it’s hardly possible for us 
to absorb the costs of a US$20 million project.”
One solution was for Sunlabob to become a turnkey 
operator and co-developer in a private-private partnership 
(refer to Figure 1).
If successful, this model would be rolled out to other 
markets where Sunlabob could apply renewable energy and 
clean water solutions. To gain the necessary expertise, Sunlabob 
held talks with its partner Relitec, a Yangon-based company 
that specialised in engineering, installation, and maintenance 
of solar technology. Schroeter believed the partnership would 
help both companies deliver high-quality, renewable, reliable 
and affordable energy to off-grid communities, while providing 
the means to support clean water solutions as well.
One matter remained unresolved: How would this project 
EHÀQDQFHG"6FKURHWHU·V LGHDZDV WRSURYLGHRIIJULGHOHFWULFLW\ 
to telecoms; 10,000 to 15,000 telecom base stations had to be 
built off-grid to meet the country’s demand for wireless 
communication, and these stations needed power. Instead of 
SUNLABOB’S FINANCING STRUCTURE FOR TURNKEY OPERATOR AND CO-DEVELOPER 
BUSINESS MODEL USING BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER MODEL
BanksDevelopmentCompany
Sunlabob
Special Purpose  
Vehicle 
(Per project)
51% 49%
100%
Investors
Equity 
funding: 60%
Debt 
funding: 40%
Owns
FIGURE 1 Source: Sunlabob
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the traditional method that used diesel 
generators, Sunlabob’s managing director 
in Myanmar, Evan Scandling, proposed 
going solar with diesel as backup.
“You size the system appropriately 
so, yes we’re supplying viable electricity 
to that anchor client [the telecom], but 
we also provide excess energy to the 
surrounding community,” Scandling 
explained. “Now these communities have 
energy access and they can charge their 
mobile phones, they can buy more phones, 
which in turn creates more customer 
demand on the telecoms side. There are 
other models too for anchor clients, say, 
a mining camp somewhere that is often 
off-grid. They’re also going to bring in 
some off-grid electricity–the idea of this 
anchor client is that you can get stable 
revenue streams coming through an 
established business and that ‘de-risks’ 
\RXUFDVKÁRZV6RWKDW·VMXVWRQWKHWRSLF
of partnerships when we are looking at 
how to make rural electrif ication 
ÀQDQFLDOO\ YLDEOHµ
Sunlabob’s strategy for continued 
international expansion rested mainly 
on its tried and tested method of 
winning international competitive bids 
and donor projects. However, the market-
based model of building village mini-
grids and off-grid rural telecom towers 
in Myanmar offered huge potential for 
growth. If implemented properly, it 
could improve the well-being and socio- 
economic status of rural communities not 
only in Myanmar, but around the world. 
New models,  
new opportunities
Social enterprises such as Sunlabob 
understand that tackling poverty requires 
cautious optimism and perseverance. 
The solutions must be sustainable, and 
cannot rely solely on charity. That said, 
business alone is not the answer either. 
Partnerships must be deployed in order 
to spread risk while leveraging expertise 
and resources. Moreover, it should be kept 
in mind that such capital investment has 
to have a long-term horizon. It is also 
more than likely that any investments into 
economic infrastructure may not yield 
GLUHFW GLYLGHQGV WR ÀQDQFLHUV
Sunlabob has successfully overcome 
challenges faced by social enterprises 
VXFKDVWKHODFNRIÀQDQFLDOVXSSRUWDODFN 
of skills among the locals, and mistrust by 
the community. It managed to secure 
donations from corporate sponsors and 
international donors, and succeeded 
in providing electrical coverage to 
75 percent of Laos, aiming to reach 
90 percent by 2020. 
The company has also adapted to 
market conditions to scale up and 
venture into other countries. It decided 
to restructure its business model to 
include greater f lexibility in funding 
sources; a base in Hong Kong to 
attract foreign investors; partnerships 
with companies that had strong local 
knowledge and expertise; and a move 
toward a market-based pricing model.
Sunlabob’s experience in Laos and 
Myanmar, and its agility and willingness 
to learn and adapt, will go a long way in 
its pursuit for international expansion 
DQG SURÀWDELOLW\
The market-based 
model of building 
village mini-grids and 
off-grid rural telecom 
towers in Myanmar 
offers huge potential  
for growth.
Ravi Chidambaram
is the President and Co-founder of  
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